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Hack: Hack: Sovereign Immunity and Public Entities

Note
Sovereign Immunity and Public Entities
in Missouri: Clarifying the Status
of Hybrid Entities
Stacy v. Truman Medical Center'
I. INTRODUCTION

In the last fifteen years, the doctrine of sovereign immunity' in Missouri
has been abrogated,3 reestablished, 4 amended5 and clarified.6 The recent
Missouri Supreme Court decision of Stacy v. Truman Medical Center' falls
within the last category.
Stacy addressed the undefined term "public entity" as found in the
Missouri sovereign immunity statute, particularly as it is applied to a "hybrid
entity."8 A hybrid entity is an entity which is not easily classified as public
or private. 9 The court attempted to provide much needed guidelines in the

1. 836 S.W.2d 911 (Mo. 1992).
2. Sovereign or governmental immunity generally refers to the concept that the
state, its agencies, and local units of government are not subject to actions in tort
except when the state has consented to be sued. Though beyond the scope of this
Note, the terms governmental immunity and sovereign immunity are not necessarily
synonymous. 57 AM. JUR.2D Municipal, County, School and State Tort Liability § 3
(1988). However, for clarity, the terms will be used interchangeably.
3. Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 230 (Mo. 1977).
4. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 537.600-.650 (1978) (Amended 1985).
5. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 537.600.1, .600.2 (1986).
6. See Bartley v. Special School Dist. of St,Louis County, 649 S.W.2d 864, 868
(Mo. 1983) (holding that since its reinstatement, sovereign immunity has been the rule
for all public entities unless a certain prescribed exception is applicable); Winston v.
Reorganized School Dist. R-2, Lawrence County, 636 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Mo. 1982)
(holding that statutes which allow claims for some injuries, but not others, do not
violate equal protection theories); McCrory v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Comm'n,
756 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that Missouri Revised Statute
§ 537.610 was repealed to the extent it would apply to the provisions of
§§ 537.600.1(1) and (2)).
7. 836 S.W.2d 911 (Mo. 1992).
8. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 917.
9. State ex. rel. Bd. of Trustees v. Russell, 843 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Mo. 1992).
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determination of what is considered a public entity for sovereign immunity
purposes. This Note will review the status of the sovereign immunity doctrine
and will examine the impact of the Stacy decision.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On December 30, 1986, Stephen Stacy and Dale Wheeler were patients
in room 327 at Truman Medical Center (hereinafter "TMC") in Kansas City,
Missouri.' With the permission of one of the nurses, Stephen Stacy was
sitting in a chair smoking." While visiting her brother, Cheryl Stacy also
was smoking and did not see an ashtray in the hospital room, so she used a
juice cup and a plastic soup tray for her ashes. 2 Later, a nurse came in and
restrained Stephen in his chair. 3 Before leaving, Cheryl lit a cigarette and,
after letting her brother inhale, she extinguished it in the soup tray. 4 Within15
minutes of her departure, a fire started in the wastebasket of the room.
Upon discovering the fire, the nurse in charge unsuccessfully attempted to
untie Stephen and put out the fire. 6 With the help of other nurses who
responded to her call for help, Stephen was pulled into the hallway."
Wheeler, in the bed farthest from the door, could not be removed in time and
died from smoke inhalation. 8 Stephen Stacy died later as a result of
complications from bums suffered in the fire. 9
In a consolidated suit, Stacy's and Wheeler's families brought wrongful
death actions before a jury against TMC and one of its nurses, Michelle
Taylor.2" The jury returned verdicts against TMC on both claims,2' but

10. Stacy v. Truman Medical Center, 836 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Mo. 1992).

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
at 915.
15. Id.Cheryl testified she may or may not have put the soup tray in the
wastebasket. She also testified she believed the soup tray was on the bedside table.
Id.
16. Id.
17. Id
18. Id
19. Id.
20. Id.
at 914.
21. The jury verdicts were in the amounts of $500,000 for the Wheeler plaintiffs
and $278,927.98 for the Stacy plaintiffs. Id.
at 927. However, the Supreme Court
remanded the case to the trial court to enter the judgment against TMC for $188,000
in favor of the Wheeler plaintiffs and $278,927.98 for the Stacy plaintiffs, both with
interest and costs. Id.
at 929.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/3
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found in favor of defendant Taylor.' However, based on its finding that
TMC was a "public entity" entitled to sovereign immunity,' the trial court
granted TMC's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.24 Both
plaintiffs appealed, and the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District,
reversed on the sovereign immunity issue.' The case was transferred to the
Missouri Supreme Court,26 with TMC appealing various issues.' This Note
will examine only TMC's appeal of the court of appeal's sovereign immunity
holding.
The supreme court "tediously" examined TMC's organization and
operation in its decision.' The predecessor of TMC, Kansas City General
Hospital and Medical Center (KCGHMC),29 was formed in 1962 as a not-forprofit corporation30 pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter 355.3"
In 1970 and 1971, KCGHMC entered into agreements to build new
facilities. 2 Upon completion of the new facilities in 1976, KCGHMC
22. Id
23. The trial court held that TMC is a "public entity" within the meaning of
Missouri Revised Statute § 537.600. Id. at 916.
24. Id. When the trial court granted TMC's motion for JNOV, it also reduced the
Wheeler verdict by finding that the original verdict for future non-economic damages
was sufficient, reducing the verdict to $188,000. Id at 929.
25. Id at 914.
26. Id
27. The other grounds on which TMC appealed included: (1) public duty doctrine
bars plaintiffs' claims; (2) no evidence to prove causal connection; (3) verdict in favor
of Defendant Taylor exonerates TMC; (4) disjunctive nature of the verdict directors;
(5) improper jury instructions; and (6) prejudicial evidentiary rulings. The court
denied each point presented on appeal by TMC, including the sovereign immunity
appeal. Id at 921-27.
28. Id at 915-16.
29. Prior to 1962, Kansas City owned and operated a hospital called Kansas City

General Hospital. Id at 915.
30. KCGHMC was formed for charitable and scientific purposes, including
services to the indigent. The incorporation was an attempt by Kansas City to access
federal and private funds not available to the hospital as a department of the city, to
alleviate political interference, and to reduce administrative problems. Truman Medical
Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 1981).
31. Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 355 (Supp. 1953).
32. In 1970, KCGHMC entered into a cooperation agreement, authorized byMo.
REv.STAT. § 70.220 (1959), with Kansas City, the Board of Trustees of the Jackson
County Public Hospital, and Jackson County for a new facility for indigent citizens of
the city and county. In 1971, the same parties, including the Curators of the

University of Missouri, entered another cooperation agreement for a new facility for
the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Medicine. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at
916.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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continued as a not-for-profit corporation and changed its name to Truman
Medical Center, Inc.33 TMC receives funds from the state, private
organizations, Jackson County, Kansas City, and its patients. 4 TMC is
operated by a self-governing board of directors, which decides the training and
qualifications of the staff.35
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order granting
TMC's motion for JNOV and reinstated the judgment.36 The court held that
TMC was not a "public entity" and consequently was not entitled
to sovereign
7
immunity under Missouri Revised Statute section 537.600.1
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The History of Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity generally precludes a litigant from
asserting what might otherwise be a meritorious cause of action against a
sovereign or a party with sovereign attributes unless the sovereign consents to
the suit."
While its origin is not fully understood,39 the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is based on the English common law maxim that the
"King can do no wrong... [and] no private citizen could sue the Sovereign
...without his consent."'
Although the doctrine of sovereign immunity
was conceived solely to protectthe King, it was soon applied to all levels of
government.4 Interestingly, this same rationale formed the basis of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to the state and federal governments

33. Id.

34.
35.
36.
reduced
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 929. The Missouri Supreme Court reinstated the Wheeler verdict, but
it in accordance with the trial court's ruling. See supra notes 21, 24.
Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 921.
BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).

39. Scholars have stated that the oldest rationale ofsovereign immunity, "the King
can do no wrong," has been historically distorted. Anthony G. Hall, Sovereign
Immunity andRe-Emergence of the Governmental-ProprietaryDistinction:A Setback
in Idaho's GovernmentalLiabilityLaw, 20 IDAHO L. REv. 197, 199-200 (1984). See
generallyEdwin M. Borchard, GovernmentalResponsibilityin Tort, 36 YALE L. J. 1
(1926); William S. Holdsworth, The History ofRemediesAgainst the Crown, 38 LAW
Q. REv. 141 (1922).
40. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN

ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS

853 (4th ed.

1984).
41. Id
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/3
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in America, according to one author.42 The 1788 English case Russell v.
Men of Devon3 was the first to enunciate the doctrine of sovereign immunity
as applied to local government." In the United States, the Supreme Court
in Chisholm v. Georgia4 s precipitated a small national crisis when it ruled
citizens could sue a state government in the federal courts.' The adoption
of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution overturned the
narrow holding of Chisholm. The amendment, however, did not affect the
power of the federal courts to define state governmental liability.47

As the doctrine of sovereign immunity spread across the country, it
developed with significant differences between the states, particularly in the
application of immunity to different units of government.4" While states and

42. OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 671
(1982).
It has been observed that there is an irony in the application in this country of
the maxim that "the King can do no wrong" since the country was founded due to the
belief that the King had done wrong. Id. (citing Herbert R. Baer, Suing Uncle Sam
in Tort, 26 N.C. L. REv. 119 (1948)). In an early case, the United States Supreme
Court found sovereign immunity inconsistent with our system of popular sovereignty.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). But before long, the Court adopted
sovereign immunity. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
43. 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
44. In this leading case, the county was held not liable in tort, chiefly because it
was not a corporation proper, but only a "quasi-corporation" and had no funds for the
payment of the judgment. James D. Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction
Between Public and Private Functionsin Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability
of Municipal Corporations,16 OR. L. REV. 250, 264 (1937).

45. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The Court was presented with the issue of
whether the federal courts' power over controversies "between a State and Citizens of
another State" meant that a state could be sued without its consent. Four of the five
justices held that it did. HALL, supra note 39, at 202. For a discussion of Chisholm
and its significance in the development of the sovereign immunity doctrine, see David
E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountabilityfor Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U.

COLO. L. REv. 1, 7-12 (1972).
46. Philip A. Harley & Bruce E. Wasinger, GovernmentalImmunity: Despotic
Mantle or Creatureof Necessity, 16 WAsHBuRN L. J. 12, 15 (1976).

47. HALL, supra note 39, at 202. The Eleventh Amendment provided no
justification for the expansion of state and federal government liability in their own
courts. Id. See also Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and OtherSovereign
Immunity Doctrines,126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1977).
48. Some jurisdictions originally drew distinctions between sovereign immunity
and governmental immunity. Sovereign immunity is sometimes deemed a specific
term limited in its application to the states and its departments-only the state is
sovereign, except to the extent it has delegated sovereignty. Governmental immunity
is described as a court-made rule derived by extending the immunity of the state to
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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their subdivisions enjoyed sovereign immunity, some jurisdictions found that
local political subdivisions, municipalities, and municipal corporations were
subject to suit and liability in tort.49 Still other jurisdictions maintained
immunity for those same political subdivisions as for the state, absent waiver
or estoppel." The majority of jurisdictions, however, did not have complete
immunity for local political subdivisions, municipalities, and municipal
corporations, but qualified the doctrine by applying the immunity only when
a municipality
performed its governmental functions, not its proprietary
51
ones.

In those jurisdictions applying the proprietary-governmental distinction,
municipalities and some municipal corporations were held liable in tort as any
private person or corporation 52 for those acts or functions determined to be
proprietary in nature. 3 Though there are variances in the application of the
distinction, some generalizations can be drawn: "[G]ovemmental activities are
normally undertaken for the good of the general public."'
Proprietary
activities, on the other hand, are undertaken for the financial profit of the
municipality and are considered business-like in nature and not connected with
the governing functions.55 The reasoning behind the distinction seems to be
that when a local government unit or political subdivision acts like a private
business, or performs functions customarily performed by such businesses, it
should be treated like a private enterprise. 6 Classifying an activity or

local governments or the inferior divisions of government, including towns, school
districts, cities, counties, and limiting governmental immunity to such political
subdivisions of the state. 57 AM. JuR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort

Liability § 3 (1988).
49. Id. at § 6.
50. Id
51. REYNOLDS, supranote 42, at 673. The distinction is usually traced to Bailey
v. City of New York, 3 Hill 531 (1842). Until then, it had usually been assumed that
municipalities would be liable for their torts like private corporations were.
REYNOLDS, supra note 42, at 673 n.9.
52. Today, the application of the governmental-proprietary distinction to
municipal corporations or local political subdivisions has been supplanted by other tests
or distinctions to determine the limits of governmental liability: the discretionaryministerial test; the general duty-special duty test; the no analogous private liability
test; the planning level-operation level test, and others. See Gail A. McCarthy, The
Varying Standardsof Governmentallmmunity: A Proposalto Make Such Standards
Easierto Apply, 24 NEW ENG. L. REv. 991 (1990).
53. 57 AM. JuR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 5
(1988).
54. REYNOLDS, supra note 42, at 674.

55. Id,
56. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/3
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function of a local government unit or political subdivision as governmental
or proprietary has proven to be difficult, with contrary results between and
within jurisdictions.57

B. Development of Sovereign Immunity Law in Missouri
Under the common law prior to 1977, the state of Missouri and its
political subdivisions were immune from suit in tort under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity." When the courts qualified the doctrine, a municipal
corporation, distinct from the state and its political subdivisions, was deemed
to exercise proprietary as well as governmental functions, and therefore was
immune only when functioning in a governmental capacity. 9
In Missouri, characterization of a governmental unit would determine the
necessity of applying the governmental-proprietary distinction or whether that
unit enjoyed complete sovereign immunity. Implicit in the historical
development of Missouri's doctrine of sovereign immunity is the distinction
of governmental immunity and sovereign immunity.' That is, the state and
its political subdivisions enjoy immunity because the state is sovereign. As
the Court in State ex rel. Regional JusticeInformation Service Commission v.
Saitz (REJIS) described it:
Any entity, apart from a municipality, which "operates under the
police power of the state in the interest of the public health,
safety and... welfare is in effect an arm of the state exercising
exclusively govenmental functions... and is therefore immune

57. For a detailed look and categorization of various activities of local
government units or municipal corporations, see, REYNOLDS, supra note 42, at § 193.
58. Wood v. County of Jackson, 463 S.W.2d 834, 835 (Mo. 1971).
59. Cullor v. Jackson Township, 249 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Mo. 1952).
60. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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of those

Characterization of a unit as a municipality, municipal corporation,62
political subdivision, or some other designation has proven to be a continual
subject for judicial decision.63 A "municipal corporation" is a broad term

that includes sewer or hospital districts and counties, which are entitled to the
full protection of sovereign immunity, as well as municipalities that have
traditionally enjoyed only partial sovereign immunity.'

Municipalities are.

immune from suit for torts arising from their governmental functions, but not
from torts arising from their proprietary functions. 65 In the context of
sovereign immunity analysis, "municipalities" include only cities, towns or
villages that are incorporated and are only partially protected by sovereign
immunity.' The term quasi-public corporation has also been used to denote
municipal corporations or special state instrumentalities functioning in a
governmental capacity and therefore immune from tort liability.67 After the
abrogation and restoration of sovereign immunity, 68 these characterizations
and the application of the governmental-proprietary distinction have become
blurred.
Because the traditional rule in Missouri69
applied the
governmental/proprietary distinction only to municipalities," the "liability

61. State ex rel. Regional Justice Info. Serv. Comm'n (REJIS) v. Saitz, 798
S.W.2d 705, 707 (Mo. 1990), (citing State ex rel. New Liberty Hosp. Dist. v. Pratt,
687 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Mo. 1985)).
62. Whether "municipality" and "municipal corporation" are synonymous depends
on their use. Taylor v. Klund, 739 S.W.2d 592, 593 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). For
example, for the purposes of cooperation agreements, they are synonymous. See St.
Louis Hous. Auth. v. City of St. Louis, 239 S.W.2d 289, 294-99 (Mo. 1951). For
purposes of exemption from taxation, they are synonymous. See Caldwell v. Little
River Drainage Dist., 236 S.W. 15, 16-17 (Mo. 1921).
63. See, e.g., Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 377 S.W.2d 348,352-53
(Mo. 1964) (holding that a sewer district was a municipal corporation and entitled to
full protection of sovereign immunity).
64. REJIS, 798 S.W.2d at 707. See, e.g., Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 377
S.W.2d at 352 and New Liberty Hosp. Dist., 687 S.W.2d at 186. Compare St. Joseph
Light and Power Co. v. Kaw Valley Tunneling, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 260 (Mo. 1979).
65. State ex rel. Trimble v. Ryan, 745 S.W.2d 672, 673-77 (Mo. 1988).
66. Beiser v. Parkway School Dist., 589 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Mo. 1979).
67. See, e.g., Cullor v. Jackson Township, 249 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Mo. 1952);
Taylor v. Klund, 739 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
68. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
70. See Cullor,249 S.W.2d at 395; Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 377 S.W.2d at
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/3
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or non-liability of a municipality for its torts [came] to depend upon the
character of the act performed, not the nature of the tort."' Furthermore, it
appears that the application of immunity as it existed before Jones v. State
Highway Commission rested on the character of the function of the entity
being sued, rather than on the nature of the entity itself.73
In 1977, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed 100 years of decisions and
prospectively abolished sovereign immunity in Missouri.74 In Jones v. State
Highway Commission,5 the court abrogated the doctrine, stating that, as a
result of the "'governmental-proprietary dichotomy' ... '[a] maze of
inconsistency' has developed in suits against cities, producing 'uneven and
unequal results which defy understanding.' 76 Responding to Jones, the
Missouri General Assembly enacted Sections 537.600 and 537.610 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes, 77 which reinstated sovereign immunity, though
modified by two exceptions. 7' The Missouri Supreme Court held in Bartley
v. Special School Districtof St. Louis Coun 7 9 that the "legislature intended
to reestablish the doctrine as it existed prior to Jones.""0 "The conclusion
reached is that the legislative intent was not to carve out legislative exceptions
to what under Jones became a judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity, but
was, rather, to overrule Jones and to carve out limited exceptions to a general
rule of immunity.""

352-53.
71. Jones, 557 S.W.2d at 229.
72. 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977).
73. "Thus a court must look to the nature of the activity performed to determine
in which capacity the city has acted." St. Joseph Light and Power Co. v. Kaw Valley
Tunneling, Inc., 589 S.W.2d at 260, 267 (Mo. 1979).
74. Prior to 1977, the state and other governmental agencies, such as school

districts, townships and sewer districts were immune from tort liability. Wartick v.
Teel, 737 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citing 2 Mo. LOCAL GovERNMENT
LAW, § 9.4 (Mo. Bar 2d ed. 1986)).

75. 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977).
76. Id at 229.
77. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 537.600, 537.610 (1978) (Amended 1985).
78. The statute waived immunity for public entities under certain circumstances
in two areas: (1) negligent operation of motor vehicles; and (2) negligently created
dangerous conditions of property. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600(1)-(2) (Supp. 1992).
79. 649 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. 1983).
80. Id. at 870.
81. Id. at 868.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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As a result, courts must again examine the "maze of inconsistencies" 82
generated by the governmental-proprietary dichotomy. 3 As the court held
in 1987, the "distinction is still viable and must be applied. 8 4 Despite the
return to the common law as it existed prior to Jones, changes have taken
place. For instance, in addition to the application of the governmentalproprietary distinction to municipalities, some courts have now required
application to school districts and other quasi-public corporations. 5
However, since the restoration, the Missouri Supreme Court has applied the
governmental-proprietary distinction to school districts.86
Other changes that have occurred since the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was codified include modifications of the statute itself in response
to decisions by the Missouri Supreme Court. In Bartley, the court held that
the express waiver exceptions in the statute depended upon the acquisition of
insurance and also concluded that the statute preserved the governmentalproprietary distinction for these exceptions.8 7 In response, the legislature
amended the statute in 1985 by adding a section stating that the waivers apply
regardless of the governmental-proprietary distinction or coverage by
insurance. 8 Later, in State ex rel. Trimble v. Ryan, 9 the court held that BiState Development Agency, as a public entity, was entitled to sovereign
immunity and was not a municipality subject to the governmental-proprietary
test?90 In apparent response, 9' the legislature enacted new subsections of the

82. O'Dell v. School Dist. of Independence, 521 S.W.2d 403, 417 (Mo. 1975)
(citing Jones, 557 S.W.2d at 229).
83. 2 Mo. LOCAL GOvERNmENT LAW, supra note 74, at § 9.6.
84. Wartick, 737 S.W.2d at 260.
85. This aplication has occurred despite the court's recognition that "[t]he
legislature ... has mandated the restoration of sovereign immunity as it existed prior
to our decision in Jones.... We are precluded by the recent legislation from making
extensions." State exrel. Missouri Dep't. of Agric. v. McHenry, 687 S.W.2d 178, 182

(Mo. 1985).
86. See State ex rel. Allen v. Barker, 581 S.W.2d 818, 825 (Mo. 1979).

87. Bartley, 649 S.W.2d at 868-70.
88. The 1985 amendment to the statute added subsection 2:

The express waiver of sovereign immunity in the instances specified
in subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection 1 of this section are absolute
waivers of sovereign immunity in all cases within such situations whether
or not the public entity was functioning in a governmental or proprietary
capacity and whether or not the public entity is covered by a liability
insurance for tort.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600.2 (Supp. 1992).
89. 745 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. 1988).
90. Id at 675.
91. Johnson v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 793 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Mo. 1990).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/3
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statute providing that sovereign immunity is waived for the proprietary
functions of multi-state agencies, such as Bi-State.'
As the courts continued to apply the statute to determine questions of
immunity,93 they were presented with a new issue spawned by the statute
itself; the statute introduced the phrase "public entity" without defining it. 4
Missouri Revised Statute section 537.600.1 provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
Such sovereign or governmental tort immunity as existed at
common law in this state ... shall remain in full force and
effect; except that, the immunity of the public entity from
liability and suit for compensatory damages for negligent acts or
omissions is hereby expressly waived in the following instances
95

The task of defining "public entity" has thus been left to the courts.96
In State ex rel. Regional Justice Information Service Commision v. Saitz
(RFJIS), the Missouri Supreme Court found that "[b]ecause § 537.600
mandates restoration of sovereign immunity as it existed prior to September
12, 1977, and because "publicentity' was not a term of artprior to that time,
the Court must first determine whether REJIS is an entity of the sovereign."'
The court concluded that REJIS was a "unique creature to have emerged from

92. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600.3-.4 (Supp. 1992).
93. See, e.g., State ex. rel. St. Louis Hous. Auth. v. Gaertner, 695 S.W.2d 460
(Mo. 1985).
94. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600.3 (Supp. 1992) contains a partial definition
regarding a multi-state compact agency, which is not of assistance to the present issue.
"The term 'public entity' as used in this section shall include any multi-state compact
agency created by a compact formed between this state and any other state which has
been approved by the Congress of the United States." Id. See supra notes 89-92 and
accompanying text for the significance of this subsection of the statute.
95. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.600.1 (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
96. In State ex rel. RegionalJustice Info. Service Comm'n v. Saitz, (REJIS), the

Supreme Court stated: "For clarification, the Court notes that the legislature's passage
of § 537.600 ... introduced the phrase 'public entity' to the lexicon of this area of
jurisprudence. Not statutorily defined, the phrase has engendered confusion... in an
area already riddled by pitfalls of terminology." REJIS, 798 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Mo.
1990) (citations omitted). The court cites two examples of "pitfalls of terminology."
First, "'municipality' versus 'municipal corporation."' (citing State ex rel. St. Louis
Hous. Auth. v. Gaertner, 695 S.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Mo. 1985)). Second,
"'governmental' versus 'proprietary function."' (citing Counts v. Morrison-Knudsen,
Inc., 663 S.W.2d 357, 362 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)).
97. REJIS, 798 S.W.2d at 706 (emphasis added).
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the legislature's primordial soup"98 As a result, to determine that REJIS
was an entity of the sovereign (i.e., a public entity), the court examined the
genesis of REJIS, its statutory basis, and its character."
As REIS illustrates, not all entities fit within
the traditional categories
of the state, its political subdivisions, municipalities, or municipal
corporations, which were used to determine sovereign immunity prior to 1977.
Entities are being created by the legislature that defy categorization within the
traditional concepts, but which still may be characterized as public
entities."° The courts have not automatically denied immunity to entities
not specifically considered "public entities" prior to 1977. 0 The question
of whether these "hybrid entities"'" are public entities entitled to sovereign
immunity has thus far been decided on a case-by-case basis. 3
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The court first addressed the statutory construction of Missouri Revised
Statute section 537.600, and found the term "public entity" to be undefined by
the statute."° Based on the legislative history, however, the court held that
"public entities" that enjoyed immunity before Jones are likewise immune
under the statute.0 Relying on the definition of "public entity" in Missouri
Revised Statute section 537.700.2(3), (regarding public entity risk
management) to provide clarification, the court concluded that TMC, a private,
riot-for-profit corporation,"° was not a "public entity" under the sovereign
immunity statute.0 However, the court rearticulated the issue by stating

98. Id
99. Id. at 706-08.
100. See, e.g., REJIS, 798 S.W.2d at 707-08; State ex rel. Trimble v. Ryan, 745
S.W.2d 672, 673-74 (Mo. 1988).
101. See, e.g., REIS, 798 S.W.2d at 706; State ex rel. Cass Medical Ctr. v.
Mason, 796 S.W.2d 621, 622-23 (Mo. 1990); State ex rel. Trimble, 745 S.W.2d at
675.
102. The Missouri Supreme Court in Stacy has called entities not specifically
listed in section 537.700.2(3) but immune by case law before 1977 "hybrid entities."
Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 917. The issue to be determined is whether the "hybrid entity
is enough like a public entity that it is entitled to sovereign immunity under section
537.600." Id.
103. See, e.g., REIS, 798 S.W.2d at 706; State ex rel. Cass Medical Cr., 796
S.W.2d at 622-23; State ex rel Trimble, 745 S.W.2d at 675.
104. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 917.
105. Id.
106. Organized pursuant to Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 355 (Supp. 1953).
107. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 916-17. This court had found the Kansas City General
Hospital, a predecessor of TMC, to be entitled to sovereign immunity. See Zummo
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/3
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that hybrid entities have been protected in recent decisions and questioned
whether TMC was enough like a public entity to be protected.' °8
Drawing on three recent Missouri wrongful death cases, the Stacy court
outlined the requirements for determining whether a hybrid entity should be

considered a "public entity." In each of the cases relied on, the Missouri
Supreme Court had examined the hybrid entities and their organization, and
concluded that they were entitled to immunity. Each of these cases involved
a different type of hybrid entity. First, in State ex rel. Regional Justice
Information Service Commission v. Saitz, (REJIS)'° an agreement between
the City of St. Louis and St. Louis County created the joint commission,
REJIS, to provide a regional criminal database."' Second, in State ex rel.
Trimble v. Ryan,"' a 1949 agreement between Missouri and Illinois created
the Bi-State Development Agency, which was responsible for coordinating and
operating transportation, water and sewage systems."' Finally, State ex rel.
was
Cass Medical Center v. Mason"' involved a county hospital that
114
operated by elected trustees who reported to the county commission.
v. Kansas City, 225 S.W. 934 (Mo. 1920). However, the court in Stacy stated that
Zummo was of little or no precedential value in the instant case.
108. The court in Stacy cited a federal court decision which decided that TMC
was not a political subdivision for purposes of whether the National Labor Relations
Board had jurisdiction over TMC. Truman Medical Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 570
(8th Cir. 1981). The Stacy court noted that the factors stressed by the Eighth Circuit
have also been considered important in several public entity cases in Missouri. Stacy,
836 S.W.2d 917-18. Those factors were outlined by the Stacy court: "[A]n entity is
considered a political subdivision of the state only if it is either created directly by the
state, so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of the government, or is
administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general
public." Id. at 917.
109. 798 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. 1990).
110. The agreement was entered into pursuant to Mo. REV. STAT. § 70.220
(1986). REJIS, the joint commission, replaced "REJIS, Inc.," a Missouri Revised
Statutes Chapter 355 not-for-profit corporation. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 918 (citing
REJIS, 798 S.W.2d at 706).
111. 745 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. 1988).
112. The agreement and the agency's operation was established according to Mo.
REV. STAT. § 70.370 (1986). According to Section 70.360, ten commissioners, five
from each state are appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate. The
commissioners must report the agency's operations to each governor. Stacy, 836
S.W.2d at 918 (citing Trimble, 745 S.W.2d at 674).
113. 796 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1990).
114. Cass Medical Center was organized and is operated pursuant to Mo. REV.

STAT. §§ 205.160-205.379 (1986). Cass Medical Cr., 796 S.W.2d at 621. The Stacy
court stated that "[t]he application of sovereign immunity to a county hospital
organized pursuant to section 205.160 is well settled." Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 918,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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Based on the common features of these three cases,"' s the court
articulated the following requirements for sovereign immunity. Under the first
requirement, each entity must perform a service traditionally performed by the
government." 6 As examples of meeting this requirement, the court
identified the creation of a criminal database in REJIS, city transportation in
Trimble, and medical care in Cass Medical Center."7 The court avoided the
governmental-proprietary distinction by holding it to be too limiting and
confusing for analyzing this requirement."'
Under the second requirement, which the court indicated was the most
critical, the entities must be "controlled by and directly answerable to, the
public or public officials or public entities.""' 9 In each of the three cases

analyzed by the court, the entities fulfilled this requirement.'
The final requirement centered on the creation of the entity. This
requirement examined how the entity was formed and who formed it.'
Regarding new governmental agencies or political subdivisions, the court
indicated that they "are formed by [the] government itself or by the voters.
We do not expect a group of individuals to be able to form their own
governmental body.""
Applying, the three "public entity" requirements to TMC, the court held
that TMC was not a "public entity." The court recognized that providing
medical care to indigent residents is a service traditionally performed by the
government," thus satisfying the first requirement.
However, the
operation of the hospital failed the second requirement of control and

citing Gavan v. Madison Memorial Hosp., 700 S.W.2d 124 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
Gabbett v. Pike County Memorial Hosp., 675 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
115. The court found that the three common features of these cases were also
relied upon in Truman Medical Ctr. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1981). Stacy,
836 S.W.2d at 919.
116. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 919.
117. Id
118. The court states, "mhis requirement is much broader because we are asking
whether this entity does what government has typically done in the past; because
government performs both governmental and proprietary functions, activities fitting
within either of those categories should satisfy this requirement." Id
119. Id
120. In REJIS,the commission is responsible to the city and county. In Trimble,
the governor selects the commissioners who must report their operations to the
governors. In Cass Medical Center, the elected trustees must report to the county
commission. Id
121. Id
122. Id
123. Id
124. Id
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/3
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accountability." 5 TMC is not controlled by the city or county; a private
board of directors took control when TMC was organized under Missouri
Revised Statutes Chapter 355 as a not-for-profit corporation.'26 Though the
board consists of some directors associated with or appointed by governmental
entities, the majority of the directors are not government related and the board
is not answerable to any government entity. 27 As a result of this analysis,
the court ruled that TMC could not meet the second requirement, and
therefore was not a public entity.'
As to the third requirement concerning the creation of the entity, the
court stated that because TMC did not satisfy the second requirement, it would
not determine the "precise features" of the third, nor whether TMC would
meet such a requirement. 2 9 Despite this assertion, the court went on to
analyze this requirement by evaluating the statute under which ElIS was
organized, Missouri Revised Statutes section 70.220, and comparing that to
TMC's organization under Chapter 355.30 The court stated that under
Section 70.220, a governmental body can enter into a joint venture with a
private person, firm or corporation, but that does not make the private entity
a governmental one.'
Similarly, incorporation under Chapter 355 will not
make public a private entity.132 The court stated that policy reasons do not

allow such an extension of immunity.

133

In further analysis of the third requirement, the court posed the theoretical
supposition that organization under Chapter 355 should not automatically be
fatal to an entity seeking immunity. 34
The court felt that it was

significant 35 that REJIS, a dissolved Chapter 355 entity that qualified for
immunity, 3 used the joint commission created under section 70.260 as both

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

d
Id.
Id
Id.
Id at 921.

130. Id at 919-21.
131. Id
132. Id. at 920.
133. The court stated that if a public entity could extend its immunity to private
entities without statutory authorization, such an extension would be at the expense of
the victims injured by private entities which enjoy immunity by association. "We
question whether the legislature contemplated the casual kind of proliferation of
sovereign immunity that would result from such a broad interpretation .... " Id
134. Id at 920-21.
135. Id
136. See REJIS, 798 S.W.2d at 706-07.
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its operating entity and controlling board.'37 Again, the court concluded that
because Chapter 355 organization is not significant to an entity's operation
and control, the entity's continued existence under Chapter 355 should not be
fatal to its qualification for sovereign immunity.3 8 The court chose not to
determine this issue in either the broader analysis of the third requirement, or
in the application to TMC. 9
After failing to meet the requirements as outlined by the court,
particularly for the lack of public control or accountability, the.court held that
TMC was not a "public entity" for the purposes of the sovereign immunity
statute 4' and therefore not protected from liability.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Blackmar agreed with the approach and
analysis of the majority opinion, but offered additional observations. ' He
stated that the court is serving the legislature's purpose when it extends42
sovereign immunity to public hospitals as in Cass Medical Center.
Furthermore, a consortium among state entities to provide health care "should
likewise be immune."' 43 However, in the case of TMC, Judge Blackmar
recognized the circumstances that differentiated TMC from the public entities
found in CassMedical Center and Trimble. First, when control of TMC was
surrendered to the trustees, the result was that TMC resembled the charitable
model more than the sovereign one.44 Second, organization under Chapter
355 should not be determinative; the essential issue is public control of the
146
entity.' 45 Third, TMC was created "to alleviate political interference,"'
with the effect of changing TMC to a charitable type entity rather than a
sovereign one."' Finally, concerned for those governmental entities which

137. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 920.
138. Id. at 920-21.
139. Id. at 92i. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
140. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 921.
141. Id at 929-30 (Blackmar, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 929
143. Id
144. Id.
145. Id at 930. "[REJIS] shows that public agencies may use Chapter 355, ifthe
element of control is present." Id
146. Id. "An agency that is free from politics is not a public entity." Id.
147. Id Judge Blackmar goes on to address the federal case involving TMC,
Truman Medical Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1981). He states that

though the decision is sound, it is not dispositive on the state's decisions regarding
sovereign immunity. The NLRB exists for a special purpose, and its determination to
accept jurisdiction does not control regarding sovereign immunity. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d
at 930.
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do solicit and receive cofhtributions from the public, Judge Blackmar indicated
1 48
that receiving private contributions should not bar sovereign immunity.

V. COMMENT
In this section, several questions and issues must be addressed to realize
the importance of the Stacy v. Truman Medical Centerdecision to the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. First, the requirements developed in Stacy will
generally be examined to better understand their purpose. The focus in the
second section will be on the application of the Stacy requirements. Finally,
the utility of Stacy will be outlined, identifying the need for the Stacy
requirements and their effectiveness.
A. Test Analyzed
The Stacy decision provides guidelines for defining and interpreting the
nebulous term "public entity" included in the Missouri sovereign immunity
statute.149 Prior to the Jones abrogation, whether an entity was a public
The courts, when deciding whether a
entity was not an issue.'
municipality was protectedby immunity, utilized the governmental-proprietary
Since 1978 and the enactment of the sovereign immunity
distinction.'
statute, that distinction remains viable' and is not called into question by
the instant case.' The issue in the instant case was the meaning and scope
of the term "public entity."

148. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 930.
149. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (Supp. 1992).
150. This Note relies on the absence of any cases prior to Jones,where this was
an issue, to support this statement.
151. See supranotes 51-73 and accompanying text.
152. See Wollard v. City of Kansas City, 831 S.W.2d 200,203 (Mo. 1992) ("The
common law governmental/proprietary test retains vitality only in suits against
municipal corporations that do not involve the express waivers contained in
§ 537.600.")
"Wen...the defendant is a municipality, the analysis focuses on the
activity giving rise to the injury to determine whether the activity was an
exercise of a governmental or proprietary function. The question is
significant because, before September 12, 1977, municipalities did not enjoy
complete sovereign immunity. Rather, they were immune from liability
arising from their governmental activities but were not immune from
liability arising from their proprietary activities."
State ex rel. Board of Trustees v. Russell, 834 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Mo. 1992); see also
State ex rel. Wartick v. Teel, 737 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
153. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 919.
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Though the primary focus of the Missouri Supreme Court in Stacy was
the determination of when a hybrid entity enjoys sovereign immunity, the
court also addressed the broader question of what constitutes a public entity
under Missouri Revised Statute section 537.600. In its analysis, the court
developed three approaches to that question: sovereign immunity of a public
entity based on (1) history; (2) a statutory definition; and (3) factors test.
First, the.Stacy court noted that an entity will be considered a public entity for
the purposes of sovereign immunity if that entity historically enjoyed
immunity. The court stated that "based on legislative history, this statute
protects 'public entities' that were protected under the sovereign immunity
cases prior to September 12,,1977."''
Second, the court identified another approach that can be taken in the
determination of what is a public entity. If the entity is one of the specific
entities listed in Missouri Revised Statute section 537.700.2(3), it will be
considered a public entity for sovereign immunity purposes. The court found
it significant that the legislature in 1989 partially defined the term "public
entity" in section 537.700.2(3), the statute relating to risk management for
public entities."' This fact "signifie[d] that this term is intended to
encompass the entities that will be protected under the statute."'56 The court
determined that because Missouri Revised Statute section 537.745.1 "provides
that the liability of public entities under sections 537.700 to 537.755 shall be
the same as liability of public entities under the sovereign immunity
statute,"'57 the definition in section 537.700.2(3) "may be helpful in
determining the scope of 'public entities"' under the sovereign immunity
statute.15 When the court applied this approach to TMC, it found that TMC
was not one of the listed entities in the definition.
The third approach developed by the court to determine whether an entity
is a public entity is the factors test. Though the Stacy court did not use the
term "test" when referring to the public entity requirements it outlined, courts

154. Id. at 917.
155. Id. The court is referring to Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.700.2(3) (1986), the
statute on "Public Entity Risk Management" which specifically defines "public entity"
for pu!poses of Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 537.700 - 537.755 (1986 and Supp. 1992).
156. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 917.
157. Mo. REV. STAT. §537.745.1 (1986).

158. Id. The definition of "public entity," in § 537.700.2(3), that the court uses
as a foundation for the term "public entity" for sovereign immunity purposes, provides
as follows:
"(3) 'Public entity', any city, county, township, village, town municipal
corporation, school district, special purpose or taxing district, or any other local public
body created by the general assembly."
Mo. REv. STAT. §532.700.2(3) (1986).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/3

18

1993]

Hack: Hack: Sovereign Immunity and Public Entities
HYBRID ENTITIES

applying it in the future will likely refer to it as such."5 9 The test was
developed as a result of the unique nature of Truman Medical Center. The
court found that TMC failed in meeting the two approaches previously
discussed, but that the issue remained "whether a hybrid entity is enough like
.
o
a public entity that it's entitled to sovereign immunity ...
The court relied on the common features of recent cases to determine if
TMC, as a hybrid entity, was a public entity.' The Stacy court synthesized
these common features and presented them as a three-pronged threshold test
for determining whether an entity is a public entity for the purposes of
sovereign immunity.
The first prong of the test, requiring that the entity perform a service
traditionally performed by the government,62 is rooted in the essential
reason for having sovereign immunity: governmental activities are normally
undertaken for the good of the general public and not for profit, and entities
performing them should not be held liable in tort.' By requiring an entity
to perform a traditional government service, the court preserved the purpose
of continuing sovereign immunity. This first requirement is also rooted in a
fundamental policy reason for having sovereign immunity: more money is
available for the public purpose if immunity is granted."M If protection
from tort liability is not given to services traditionally performed by the
government, the money for those services will be sacrificed not only to
compensate those injured, but also to pay the lawyers, insurance companies,
-and others who would stand to profit. Thus, requiring that hybrid entities
provide traditional government services insures that the allocation of money
saved goes to purposes that have broad public interest and support.

159. See, e.g., Dorlon v. City of Springfield, 843 S.W.2d 934,940 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992) ("The three tests elaborately spelled out in Stacy for determining whether an
entity is a public entity ... convinces [sic] us the City of Springfield is a public entity
•.. "); Balderree v. Beeman, 837 S.W.2d 309, 317 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) ("[W]e have
studied Stacy... [and] the three tests spelled out there for determining whether an
entity is a public entity ...strengthen our conclusion that LOCLG is one.").
However, in State ex rel. Board of Trustees v. Russell, 843 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Mo.
1992), the Missouri Supreme Court identified Stacy as "discussing certain factors for
determining status of 'hybrid' entities." Id at 358.
160. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 917.
161. See supra note 99.
162. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 919.
163. REYNOLDS, supra note 42, at 674.
164. "It is readily apparent the legislature intended to balance the need for
protection of governmental funds against a desire to allow redress for claimants injured
in limited classes of accidents." Winston v. Reorganized School Dist. R-2, Lawrence
County, 636 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Mo. 1982).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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The court called the second prong of the test the most critical: the entity
must be controlled by and directly answerable to public officials, entities or
the public itself.6 5 It is not enough that the service performed is
governmental; there must be a direct connection between the entity and the
government. Furthermore, this requirement goes further than listing the
directors of the entity. The requirement demands a deeper analysis of the
nature of the control of the entity by requiring accountability to the public
and/or the government. Without this requirement, there is the danger that an
entity, though actually private in nature, would claim to be public for the
benefit of immunity."
The policy inherent in this requirement is that if hybrid entities are
afforded protection in order to insure that resources go to public needs, it is
important to require accountability to the public or those selected by the
public. This ensures that the money provided by the state or local government
or saved as a result of sovereign immunity will be used in a way acceptable
to and for the best benefit of the public.
The third prong of the test focuses on the creation of the entity, and how
and by whom the entity was formed.'67 Again, the policy of accountability
to the public is furthered because private individuals are not able to form a
governmental entity and avail themselves of the benefits of sovereign
immunity. Only the government itself or the voters in the aggregate are able
to form governmental entities.
It is tempting to believe that the analysis for the third prong is fairly
straightforward because the court suggested a statutory construction approach.
The difficulty, however, is posed by the court when it addressed the possibility
that statutory construction is not an automatic bar to qualification for
sovereign immunity nor is it a guarantee.' 68 The court seems to be
suggesting that it would be wise to remember "substance over form." Because
the court chose not to address the implications of69 its supposition, the
guidelines for the third requirement are not complete.
165. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 919.
166. This idea was suggested by the discussion in Stacy, although the context in
the opinion was regarding the third requirement. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 920.
167. Id.
at 919.
168. Id.at 919-21. The court noted that an entity's existence or organization
under chapter 355 as a not-for-profit organization is not necessarily fatal to its
qualification for sovereign immunity. What is significant is who operates and controls
the entity. Id at 920-21. On the other hand, a cooperation agreement between a
municipality or a political subdivision and a private firm or corporation does not
convert the private organization into a public one. Id. at 920.
169. The court seems to indicate that "[i]f TMC [had met] the first requirement
of performing a governmental activity.., and if its board was organized to meet the
second requirement concerning control," then whatever its original statutory creation,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss3/3
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B. Application of Stacy
The Stacy test was developed to determine whether TMC, a hybrid entity,
was a public entity within the meaning of section 537.600 and hence whether
it was entitled to sovereign immunity from tort liability. 7 This test will be
used to determine this question in future cases involving
hybrid entities. The
71
Stacy test has already been recognized in three cases.'
However, the benefit of the Stacy decision is not only that it developed
a thorough test for determining the status of hybrid entities, but the decision
also satisfactorily addressed the underlying need for clarification of what is a
public entity for sovereign immunity purposes. Prior to the decision in Stacy,
the courts dealing with this issue did not articulate in specific terms how one
generally can recognize a public entity. Rather, the cases172were markedly
dependent upon their individual circumstances and statutes.
Since State ex rel. Regional Justice Information Service Commission v.
Saitz" (REAS) and Stacy, courts have recognized that the threshold
question to the sovereign immunity issue is whether an entity is a public
entity. 74 The Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. Board of Trustees v.
Russell75 recently confirmed that before courts can address the other issues
of sovereign immunity, they must first make a ruling on the entity question.
In the future, because of the Stacy decision, entities seeking sovereign
immunity because of public entity status appear to have three methods of
opportunity to gain that status: if the entity historically enjoyed sovereign
immunity status prior to the abrogation; 76 if the entity meets the statutory

it won't necessarily be barred from sovereign immunity. Id. at 920. That is to say,
if the court had found that TMC had met the first two prongs, TMC would have met

the third.
170. Id at 916.
171. As of March 10, 1993 one Missouri Supreme Court decision and two
Southern District Missouri Court of Appeals decisions have mentioned the Stacy test.
See State ex rel. Bd. of Trustees v. Russell, 834 S.W.2d 353 (Mo. 1992); Balderree
v. Beeman, 837 S.W.2d 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Dorlon v. City of Springfield, 843
S.W.2d 934 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). However, their application of the test was minimal.
172. For instance, even the holdings of the three cases discussed at length by the
Stacy court were of limited applicability beyond the facts and statutes of those cases.

See supra notes 109-115 and accompanying text.
173. 798 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. 1990).
174. See State ex rel. Regional Justice Info. Service v. Saitz, 798 S.W.2d. 705,
706 (Mo. 1990) ("[T]he court must first determine whether REJIS is an entity of the
sovereign."); Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 916.
175. 843 S.W.2d 353 (Mo. 1992).
176. Assuming, also, that the entity's operation and control since that time still
qualify it for public entity status. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 3
MISSOURILAW REVIEW
[Vol. 58

definition of "public entity" as found in Missouri Revised Statute section
537.700.2(3); or if the entity can meet the three requirements of the Stacy test.
The crucial aspect of the Stacy decision, however, is the test the court
developed for determining the status of hybrid entities. Several potential
applications of the Stacy test can be identified. First, the Stacy test may
become the threshold standard for all public entities seeking immunity under
the statute, not just hybrid entities. Whether such a standard will simply act
as a rubber stamp for traditional categories of public entities to pass the
threshold question is unclear.
Dorlon v. City of Springfield" seems to indicate this type of rubber
stamp application: After examining the statutory language and case precedent,
the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, concluded that the city of
Springfield was a public entity entitled to the protection of section
537.610.2.78 The court then stated: "Our view is fortified by Stacy ....
The three tests elaborately spelled out in Stacy for determining whether an
entity is a public entity convinces [sic] us the City of Springfield is a public
entity as that term is used in § 537.610.2."'" It is unclear why the court
mentioned the test at all when the city can meet the first two approaches as
set out by Stacy.
The Stacy decision itself introduced the potential rubber stamp application
of the test. To develop the test for public entities, the court relied on three
Missouri cases where the court held that the entity involved was a public
entity. 8 Interestingly, one of the cases used as a basis for developing its
test, State ex rel. Cass Medical Center v. Mason,'' did not involve a hybrid
entity, but rather, a county hospital that fell within a traditional category.'82
Because the court used this non-hybrid entity case to develop the public entity
test, the court may be indicating that all public entities will possess the three
requirements as common features and therefore all entities must be analyzed

177. 843 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
178. Id at 940.
179. Id

180. State ex rel. Cass Medical Ctr. v. Mason, 796 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Mo. 1990);
State ex rel. Regional Justice Info. Serv. Comm'n (REJIS) v. Saitz, 798 S.W.2d 705,
707 (Mo. 1990); State ex rel. Trimble v. Ryan, 745 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Mo. 1988).
181. 796 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1990).
182. The analysis of Cass MedicalCenter by the court in Stacy revealed that it
was a county hospital created pursuant .to Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 205 (1986) and
therefore entitled to sovereign immunity. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 918-919. "I]he
application of sovereign immunity to a county hospital pursuant to section 205.160 is
well settled." Id.
at 918, citingGavan v. Madison Memorial Hosp., 700 S.W.2d 124,
127 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
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under this test. This potential application may be reaching beyond the intent
of the court.
The Stacy test will be valuable in determining the status of entities that
have been created since the abrogation but which do not fall into any of the.
traditional categories. These entities may be hybrid entities created by the
legislature with both private and governmental functions and characteristics.
The best example of this type of hybrid entity is REJIS, the regional criminal
database shared by the City of St. Louis and St. Louis County. In REIS, the
court called REJIS "a unique creature to have emerged from the legislature's
primordial soup." '
The Stacy test also will apply in determining the entity status for those
entities that may have been created as public entities, but which have since
been privatized. This conclusion is based on the court's discussion of the
third requirement of its test: if the entity passes the governmental activity and
control requirements, its organization under a particular statute should not
automatically bar it from status as a public entity. Reversing this logic, if an
entity prior to 1977 enjoyed sovereign immunity, but no longer performs a
governmental activity or is no longer subject to governmental control, it
automatically will not be guaranteed sovereign immunity as a public entity.
For example, in Stacy, when the court analyzed the second requirement of
public control, it noted that Kansas City and Jackson County gave up control
of TMC to a private board of directors when the not-for-profit corporation

was organized in 1962.'
Even if the test is applied to any or all of the above situations, there are
still questions as to how the Stacy test will be applied. If the courts only
regard Stacy as a factors-type test, with a weighing and balancing effect, then
the application of the test could have very different results from what the
Missouri Supreme Court intended.
C. The Utility and Effectiveness of the Stacy Test
In this section the utility of Stacy test will be outlined, identifying the
need for the test and its effectiveness. In considering the test's utility, it may
be argued that the court in Stacy unnecessarily developed a test for public
entities. Several arguments support this position.
First, it could be argued that there was no basis for the court to develop
a test to determine public entities under the sovereign immunity statute.
Section 537.600 states that the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it existed at
common law in Missouri prior to September 12, 1977, except as modified,

183. RE1JS, 798 S.W.2d at 706.
184. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 919.
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abrogated, or waived by statute, remains in full force and effect.'85 One
could argue that the legislature was only attempting to return to the doctrine
as it existed prior to Jones with any exceptions to its status being provided in
those sections enacted.'86 Furthermore, "[u]nder intrinsic principles of
statutory construction, any treatment given by this court to the doctrine
87
established by the legislature requires strict and narrow legal exegesis."'1
This approach would advocate a type of "frozen in time" standard to be
applied not only to the governmental-proprietary distinction,'88 but also to
the municipality-municipal corporation question.'89 The same would be true
for a public entity. If an entity maintained public entity status prior to Jones,
the same should remain true after Jones."9°
This rationale is flawed, however. Though the legislature reinstated the
common law sovereign immunity doctrine, the common law itself is not

STAT. § 537.600.1 (Supp. 1992).
186. Bartley v. Special School Dist. of St. Louis County, 649 S.W.2d 864, 870
(Mo. 1983).
187. Id
188. In State ex rel.New Liberty v. Pratt, 687 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1985), the court
held that the traditional rule permits the application of the governmental-proprietary
distinction only to municipalities and that powers granted to hospital districts are
governmental, and therefore hospital districts are immune from liability. Id. at 186.
Hence, a hospital district'was considered governmental in function and immune preJones, and remains immune post-Jones.
189. In State ex rel. St. Louis Housing Auth. v. Gaertner, 695 S.W.2d 460 (Mo.
1985), Judge Blackmar in his dissenting opinion advocates the position that prior
determinations of whether an entity is a municipality or a municipal corporation should

185. Mo. REv.

be controlling. Id at. 463-464. In that case, the St. Louis Housing Authority had
been determined a pre-Jones municipality for the purpose of cooperation agreements
in St. Louis Housing Auth. v. City of St. Louis, 239 S.W.2d 289, 294 (Mo. 1951).
Judge Blackmar stated, "[n]o reason is adduced as to why the Housing Authority
should be held to be a municipality in 1951 for purposes of the corporation statutes,
but should not be held to be a municipality in 1985 for purposes of the of the statutes
authorizing procurement of insurance [for the application of waiver in sovereign
immunity]." Gaertner,695 S.W.2d at 463 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
190. Cf State ex rel. Trimble v. Ryan, 745 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. 1988), in which
Judge Blackmar, in his dissenting opinion, attacks the majority's position that the basic
task is to determine whether Bi-State is a "public entity." Judge Blackmar states:
This approach is purely conceptualistic. The phrase, "public entity".. . was
introduced into this area of jurisprudence by § 537.600, which neither
defines nor enlarges the perimeters of sovereign immunity, leaving to the
courts the traditional function of determining the common law. Our courts
are perfectly capable of deciding what the common law is, or was at a point
in time, even in the absence of decisional authority.
Id at 677. (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
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frozen in time, but by its nature builds upon the foundations laid.
Furthermore, different types of entities exist today that were not even in
existence when the doctrine was abrogated. As the government takes on new
functions in our increasingly complex society, new entities are created in
response to public policy needs. To freeze a public entity determination to
what existed fifteen years ago would be to potentially thwart the purpose of
the sovereign immunity doctrine in Missouri; that is, to protect state
funds. 9'
Not allowing redetermination of entities after Jones would
potentially allow new state entities to be liable in tort.
It might also be that the court in Stacy, in reading the sovereign
immunity statute, gave too much weight to the term "public entity;" more
perhaps than the legislature intended. Yet, even if the legislature did not
intend for the term to acquire such importance, the courts could not properly
apply the statute without defining the term "public entity."'"
How effective this test will be remains to be seen. The effectiveness of
the Stacy test will in part be dependent on the requirements themselves. In
considering these requirements, the Stacy court allowed some flexibility. For
example, the court avoided characterizing the first requirement as a
governmental function requirement, which requires that the entity must
perform a traditional government service. This requirement goes beyond the
governmental-proprietary distinction, for the court stated that "activities fitting
within either of those categories should satisfy this requirement."'9 3
Finally, in considering the effectiveness of the Stacy test, it could be
argued that a three-requirement, bright-line test may not be adequate to
analyze hybrid entities for purposes of sovereign immunity. Focusing on the
entity's origin, control, and traditional governmental service may be too
narrow to make a fair determination of whether an entity is a sovereign entity.
Perhaps by drawing a bright-line test,the court is defeating the very purpose
for which the test was considered necessary-to be able to identify entities

191. "It is readily apparent the legislature intended to balance the need for
protection of governmental funds against a desire to allow redress for claimants injured
in limited classes of accidents." Winston v. Reorganized School Dist. R-2, Lawrence
County, 636 S.W.2d 324, 328'(Mo. 1982).
192. "[I]t is presumed thatthe legislature does not enact meaningless provisions."
Bartley v. Special School Dist. of St. Louis County, 649 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Mo. 1983)
(citing City of Willow Springs v. Missouri State Librarian, 596 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Mo.
1980)).
193. Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 919. "IT]his requirement is much broader [than the
governmental-proprietary distinction] ... because we are asking whether this entity
does what government has typically done in the past .... In view of the broad range
of activities in which the government is involved, it is difficult to envision a hybrid
entity that meets the other requirements but would not meet this one." Id
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that deserve sovereign immunity status even though they do not fall within a
traditional category of governmental units. 94
Whether the Stacy test for hybrid entities will be applied as a bright-line
test or a facts and circumstances test remains to be seen. What is significant,
however, is that the court has elucidated an issue which had previously been
decided by a case by case determination. Furthermore, by developing a threeprong test for determining hybrid entities as public entities, the court has
clearly indicated that sovereign immunity should be narrowly confined: it
should be extended to hybrid entities only where justified by overriding
considerations, as expressed by the three requirements. The three-prong Stacy
test helps confine the grant of sovereign immunity.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Stacy decision clarified the approach Missouri courts should take
when determining what entities are entitled to protection as public entities
under the sovereign immunity statute. Whether an entity, in general, or a
hybrid entity, in particular, is a "public entity" for the purposes of the statute
can now be determined when one of three approaches is satisfied: first, if the
entity historically enjoyed sovereign immunity status prior to the abrogation
in 1977; second, if the entity meets the statutory definition of "public entity"
as found in Missouri Revised Statute section 537.700.2(3); and third, if the
entity can meet the three requirements of the Stacy test. This test, developed
in Stacy, is directed in particular at the status of hybrid entities. For a hybrid
entity to be entitled to sovereign immunity under the Stacy test, the entity

194. Judge Blackmar, in his concurring opinion, took a broader approach than the
majority, arguing that the creation and control elements were the most important in
determining the nature of an entity, and that the source of funding alone is not
determinative of public entity status. Id From these two points it can be seen that he
is arguing against a bright-line test. Other jurisdictions have endorsed factors tests to
determine the status of hybrid entities. See, e.g., Shannon v. Shannon, 965 F.2d 542,
547-48 (7th Cir. 1992); Mendrala v. Crown Mortgage Co., 955 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th
Cir. 1992); Rodriguez-Garcia v. Davila, 904 F.2d 90, 97 (1st Cir. 1990); Wright v.
Houston Indep. School Dist., 393 F. Supp. 1149, 1154 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Beck v.
Claymont School Dist., 407 A.2d 226, 229-30 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979); Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Massachusetts State College Bldg. Auth., 392 N.E.2d 1006,
1010-11 (Mass. 1979).
The analysis in Riverview Investments, Inc. v. Ottawa Community Improvement
Corp., 899 F.2d 474, 478-80 (6th Cir. 1990) bears a striking resemblance to that in
Stacy in determining whether an entity is a public entity. Though the underlying

purpose for the determination differed, the approach taken by these two courts was
remarkably similar. Perhaps this indicates the validity and applicability of the Stacy
test.
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must (1) be performing a traditional government service; (2) be controlled by
and answerable to the public or public entities; and (3) be formed by and
through the government.
By applying the approaches outlined in Stacy, entities seeking sovereign
immunity, as well as the courts, have firmer guidelines for determining which
entities qualify for sovereign immunity from tort liability in Missouri. Courts
and entities would do well to apply the crystallized approaches of Stacy:
sovereign immunity public entity status, especially for hybrid entities, need no
longer be a case-by-case, hit-or-miss determination.
MARY S. HACK
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